Introduction
The first signs of the institutionalization of "nuclear non-proliferation" date back to 1943, but in line with the US pursuits, especially the "Atom for Peace" plan at the United Nations (December 8, 1953), the "Global Agenda for the Management and Supervision of Nuclear Policy" acquired a special identity. The Shah's nuclear program in the 1960s and 1970s offered the prospect of a "broad civilian nuclear energy program" in terms of diversifying electricity generation sources and reducing sole reliance on oil exports. An important point is related to the disclosure of the bias of the aforementioned program towards nuclear fuel reprocessing (enrichment) and the production of nuclear weapons. The hypothesis is that the Shah's nuclear program, especially in the 1970s/1970s, faced the US's confrontational policy centered on non-proliferation sanctions.
Research Question(s)
The main question is: How were the strategic relations between the US and the Shah affected by his nuclear program?
Literature Review
Foreign writers such as Kordzaman (2003) have also considered a historical approach in the form of a calendar in the context of the subject matter, or, like Sheryl (2012), have paid attention to the nuclear efforts of the second Pahlavi dynasty as a marginal discussion in the context of the nuclear tension between Iran and the United States after the Islamic Revolution. In this regard, it is helpful to focus on two perspectives: first, the view that Mohammad Reza Shah's nuclear program was purely developmental and peaceful, claiming that it was a win-win situation for all parties involved (Mcglinchey, Choksy 2025); and second, that from the very beginning of the program, under the guise of a civilian nuclear program, the goal was to achieve nuclear weapons capability (Milani 2010).
Methodology
The research method used is a historical-documentary study along with a "process tracing" approach. Historical-documentary research is a qualitative method in which the researcher reconstructs and analyzes the evolution of a phenomenon over a specific period of time using documents, reports, laws, statements, statistics, speeches, and reliable sources. In this method, data are not generated through direct observation, but are extracted and analyzed from existing documents. Advantages of the historical-documentary method: The ability to examine developments over a long period of time;Access to reliable and official data;The ability to compare policies and behavior of different actors;Suitable for analyzing foreign policy and international relations.Process tracing is one of the most important qualitative research methods for explaining causal relationships. In this approach, the researcher does not simply show that two variables are related, but also explains through what mechanisms this relationship was formed.In other words, this method answers the question "How?", not simply "What relationship is there?".
Results
Contrary to the view that Mohammad Reza Shah's nuclear targeting model, in the form of "providing domestic energy needs through nuclear fission and, as a result, preserving petrochemical wealth for export to energy-hungry foreigners," was a purely developmental and peaceful program that was a win-win situation for all parties involved. Until the mid-1970s, US officials not only did not view Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's nuclear program as a "backdoor" to a nuclear weapons program; they even encouraged Iran's possession of nuclear power plants and advanced technology due to its strategic position within the framework of the US Cold War-oriented foreign policy. some analysts, based on declassified documents from the US National Security Council and the Pentagon, have concluded that Iran sought to acquire nuclear weapons capability from the very beginning of the program, under the cover of a civilian nuclear program. In the period 1974-1979/1332-1357, certain signs of the pursuit of military nuclear goals became apparent. In this regard, the following have been cited as “catalysts” of this approach:
- The rise in oil prices, especially after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, allowed the Iranian government to continue the nuclear program with adequate financial support.
- India’s nuclear test in 1974,
- The link between self-help and fear: Fuller emphasizes a kind of link between the Shah’s interests in increasing influence and credibility beyond the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean (thinking in global geostrategic terms) and the US-centric Cold War considerations of the 1970s, which led him (in the context of strategic ties with the United States) to play a counter-role to Soviet influence. Thus, the motivation for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's insistence on achieving nuclear military capabilities can be traced to "a mixture of self-help and fear"
- Iran's development prospects as an undeniable necessity,
- The adventures of the Iraqi Baathist regime.
In connection with the above explanations, some positions and behaviors, both declared and practiced (by the Iranian government), are worth mentioning. According to some evidence, the Shah's secret efforts to acquire nuclear energy were also obvious to some officials close. Gradually, signs of tension and the United States' tendency to impose technological and arms restrictions on Iran and oppose its military nuclear demand became apparent. In this regard, in addition to the sensitivities expressed in the positions of Kissinger and Ford, the claims of some nuclear experts of this government are also noteworthy; that Iran's nuclear program includes research for the production of low-level nuclear weapons (centered on the Amirabad nuclear research center), especially the laser enrichment program (which began in 1975). The outcome of the aforementioned macro-conditions can be traced in classified US government documents from 1974 to 1977, which state "opposition to Iran's efforts for reprocessing capability. Reports in the 1970s indicated that Iran had sought laser enrichment technology from the United States and had conducted experiments related to reprocessing. Intelligence reports suggested that the Shah had a secret group working on nuclear weapons .The final finding is that although the Shah's nuclear program proceeded based on multilateral support from the United States and its European allies, due to his insistence on secret enrichment of nuclear fuel, the strategic relationship between Iran and the United States was overshadowed, to the extent that the United States imposed a type of "non-proliferation sanctions" against Tehran, a behavioral pattern that demonstrated its level of adherence to the global logic of non-proliferation.